The Labour Government and Southern Africa: The Case of Apartheid in South Africa, 1964-1970 by Pierri, B.
Eunomia. Rivista semestrale di Storia e Politica Internazionali 
Eunomia V n.s. (2016), n. 1, 49-104 
e-ISSN 2280-8949 
DOI 10.1285/i22808949a5n1p49 
http://siba-ese.unisalento.it, © 2016 Università del Salento 
 
 
 
 
BRUNO PIERRI 
 
 The Labour Government and Southern Africa:  
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Abstract: In the 1960s, the British government was in a very awkward position in South Africa. The 
apartheid regime represented something contrary to western democracy principles, but for several reasons 
both London and Washington could not ignore the importance of that country. Strictly anti-communist and 
located at the junction of the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean, South Africa was pivotal to the defence of 
commercial and military sea-routes. Moreover, gold and uranium trading made Pretoria the most 
important partner of the West in the whole African continent. Finally, white regimes in the area, the 
Afrikaner one as well as those of Rhodesia and in the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique, 
granted the stability necessary to pursue Anglo-Saxon interests and at the same time contain the communist 
influence. In a word, when the Nixon Administration issued NSSM 39, stating that the whites were there to 
stay and that the only thing to do was collaborating with them, with the aim of persuading them to 
gradually reduce racial discrimination, London had already come to the conclusion that such a racist 
government was of paramount importance to the stability of area. Therefore, it was decided not to follow 
the recommendations of the United Nations to the letter.                 
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Introduction  
«We have seen the awakening of national consciousness in peoples who 
have for centuries lived in dependence upon some other power. Fifteen 
years ago this movement spread through Asia. […] today the same thing 
is happening in Africa […] the wind of change is blowing through the 
continent, and, whether we like it or not, this growth of national 
consciousness is a political fact. We must accept it as a fact […]».1  
 
With these words, addressed to both Houses of the South African Parliament,  the Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan marked a breakthrough in the history of colonialism. 
Speaking to his counterpart, Dr. Henrik Frensch Verwoerd, he had said that Britain 
would never follow Pretoria’s policy of separate development. Rather, London thought 
it was right to work for a non-racial country in which all ethnic communities would 
share power. However, the most conservative section of British politics had seen that 
statement as London’s abdication in Africa. As a consequence of this, right wing Tories 
immediately formed the “Monday Club” to mark as “Black Monday” the day 
                                                 
* TA4eae 
1 http://africanhistory.about.com. 
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Macmillan had spoken in Cape Town. An initiative like this seemed to have had a 
certain influence on the Premier’s agenda, so much so that he suggested that franchise 
arrangements should be planned in countries where there was a significant white 
minority, such as Kenya. In a few words, a sort of indirect form of voting was regarded 
as a better way to prevent the subjugation of minority interests by the majority. 2 
Whitehall had to be careful not to harm the British and Western position in Black 
Africa, keeping also an eye on the balance of power at Westminster. Hence, the path 
leading to African national liberation was long and full of hurdles and formed a 
patchwork of contradictions intertwined with Cold War issues. 
     The apartheid regime had been set up after the 1948 general elections, won by the 
Herenigde Nationale Party, or simply the National Party, whose leader, Daniel François 
Malan, had been appointed Prime Minister. He regarded those elections as the outcome of 
a long and bitter struggle to secure Afrikaner power again and redress the unjust policies 
of Great Britain. Announcing victory, in fact, he is thought to have stated: 
  
«Today South Africa belongs to us once more. For the fist time since 
Union, South Africa is our own, may God grant that it will always 
remain our own».3 
 
 Words like these perfectly matched sentiments of revenge which had been dominating 
Afrikaner nationalism since the times of the Anglo-Boer War, stressing especially unity 
of Volk, Christian-Nationalism, anti-imperialism, and republicanism. The word 
“apartheid” was a neologism meaning “apartness”, or “separateness”. It was not only a 
matter of physical separation between different ethnical groups, but it was also 
considered as a moral imperative. In 1944, Malan in Parliament had affirmed that 
apartheid was not the same as the already existing policy of segregation, which featured 
separation in the sense of fencing off and preventing the black population from mixing up 
with whites, beside completely removing franchise rights for the blacks and assigning 87 
per cent of the land to fifteen per cent of the population. Instead, he described the new 
policy in more positive terms, as a way to implement the progress of each race on the 
                                                 
2 See R. OVENDALE, Macmillan and the Wind of Change in Africa, 1957-1960, in «The Historical Journal», 
XXXVIII, 2, June 1995, p. 476-477.   
3 S. DUBOW, Apartheid, 1948-1994, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 3. 
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basis of what was their own, thus keeping them apart from each other, thus protecting 
civilization and Christianity from barbarism and heathenism.4     
     South Africa had a pivotal geographic position, being also the only independent State 
of European tradition and of substantial power and stability in the whole African 
continent. Strategically speaking, stated CIA experts in a report issued in January 1949, 
the Union of South Africa was a major stronghold in the Southern hemisphere, as a way-
station in the lines of communications to the Indian Ocean and extremely useful naval 
bases. Even more important was the fact that South Africa at that time produced at least 
twenty-three strategic minerals whose stock-piling was regarded as essential to the West, 
in particular uranium deposits. Finally, from a political point of view the Union’s 
orientation was without any doubt pro-West. Finally, we can see from this first document 
that the Americans had already realised how South African issues would affect them in 
the following years. In fact, the report ended with a sort of prediction that the Malan 
Government’s nationalistic posture would possibly weaken the British Commonwealth as 
a stabilising force in the world. Moreover, the United States, concluded the estimate, 
would be feeling the effects in the United Nations Assembly of Afrikaner intransigence.5 
As concerned domestic issues, the Truman Administration was taking a strong stance in 
favour of civil rights, such as the de-segregation of the Army, but the fierce anti-
communism shown by the Malan Government, which put the South African Communist 
out of law in 1950, made obviously Washington concerned about the troubled future of 
the African ally.6 In addition, due to the huge war effort the Americans had made only a 
few years previously, the Atlantic superpower had depleted some of its reserves of certain 
minerals crucial for its sophisticated military industry. Therefore, the White House had 
been obliged to look abroad for further supplies. Concerning this, the State Department in 
June 1948 had warned the Administration about the importance of Southern Africa for 
stockpiling materials. In consequence of this, the CIA stated the movement towards 
independence of European colonies in certain areas of the African continent had the risk 
                                                 
4 See ibid., p. 17. 
5 See The Political Situation in the Union of South Africa, 31 January 1949, ORE 1-49, Confidential, in 
www.foia.cia.gov.   
6 See T. BORSTELMANN, Apartheid’s Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early 
Cold War, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 83-84.   
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for the US to be deprived of assured access to certain military bases and raw materials 
reserves. This was even more worrying, if we consider that the US was already importing 
from South Africa relevant quantities of uranium, chrome, and manganese.7 
     As regarded British public opinion, the features of apartheid may not have been so 
publicised in the late 1940s, but is was well known that the afore mentioned doctrine was 
the ideology of the former Prime Minister’s political rivals, who were Afrikaner 
nationalists sympathising with Nazi Germany during the war. Instead, Jan Smuts had 
been a loyal ally of Britain and a proponent of the Commonwealth. To boost British 
criticism and concern on South African policies was also the awareness that the Empire 
and old dominions like South Africa had become more important than ever, since Britain 
had emerged financially weakened from the war. As an outcome of this, considerable 
British attention was focused on the decisions taken by the new Nationalist Party’s 
government in Pretoria. According to the whole political spectrum of the British press, 
the advent of an executive claiming the ideology of racism was regarded as a sort of 
disaster not only for Britain, but for the entire Commonwealth itself. Apart from this, 
apartheid policies were also seen as a threat to British colonial rule in Africa, in particular 
in the protectorates neighbouring South Africa. As a matter of fact, London was 
responsible for the rule and protection of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland, 
collectively known as the High Commission Territories. This responsibility was 
inevitably in contrast with the South African aim of taking control of those lands, but it 
was also impossible to ignore the antagonism between Africans and Europeans that the 
policies of apartheid were provoking.8 On the other hand, in the late 1940s a large part of 
the South African public opinion was well aware that the Labour government’s stance 
was becoming more and more critical towards Pretoria’s racial policies. In particular, 
Afrikaner nationalists responded to the Commonwealth transformation of 1949, allowing 
membership to  republics, too. At a glance, it had become possible for nationalists to 
fulfil their dream of complete independence, without breaking ties with the 
Commonwealth. It was a surprise that every move towards a lessening of colonial rule in 
                                                 
7 See ibid., p. 97. 
8 See R. HYAM–P. HENSHAW, The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa since the Boer War, 
Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 308-311.  
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Asia and Africa was lowering British prestige in the eyes of many white South Africans, 
while simultaneously raising it within the black population. Malan himself expressed 
deep concern in 1950, stating that the British policy of equal rights and franchise for all 
had already produced bitter fruits in Nigeria and the Gold Coast.9                     
                                  
1. A brief history of apartheid legislation                     
The first grand apartheid law was the Population Registration Act, which ensured that 
every child be assigned a racial category on birth. Official Boards were set up for those 
whose race was unclear, causing difficulty especially for coloured people and separating 
their families when members were allocated different races. The second pillar of grand 
apartheid was the Group Areas Act, allowing the government to proclaim residential and 
business areas in towns for designated races only, including Indians and coloureds. Each 
race was allotted its own area, used in later years as a basis of forced removal. Under the 
Reservation of separate Amenities Act of 1953, municipal grounds could be reserved for 
a particular race, creating separate beaches, buses, hospitals, schools and universities. 
Blacks were provided with services greatly inferior to those of whites, while a strict 
government bureaucracy developed in order to record a full national register to assign 
citizenship, employment, accommodation, and even social rights. Everything on grounds 
of race. Education was officially segregated in 1953 through the Bantu Education Act, 
crafting a separate system of education for black students and designed to prepare black 
people to be a labouring class only. In 1959, separate universities were created for black, 
coloured and Indian people. Existing universities were not permitted to enrol new black 
students. In the meantime, the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 had created separate 
government structures for blacks and whites and was the first piece of legislation to 
support the government's plan of separate development in the Bantustans, that is areas 
reserved for blacks of all different ethnic groups and commonly called Bantus. These 
amounted to only thirteen per cent of the country's land, and the  homelands were run by 
cooperative tribal leaders, regardless of their popular legitimacy, while uncooperative 
chiefs were forcibly deposed.10 Instead, the Bantu Education Act aimed at putting all 
                                                 
9 See ibid., pp. 285-286.  
10 See DUBOW, Apartheid, cit., p. 64. 
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educational provision under the control of the State, thus ending the independent church 
school system through which a small African elite had been formed for about a century.11 
Hendrik Verwoerd, who had introduced the Act, addressing the Senate in June 1954 
stated there was no place for the Bantus in the European community, since they had to be 
guided to serve their own population. Hence, there was no need for Africans to receive 
training aimed at absorption in the white community. The former system, according to 
Verwoerd, had only shown the Bantus the green pastures of European society, thus 
misleading them from their own people and traditions. This speech was supposed to 
spread two messages: a) blacks were to be treated as mere units of cheap labour; therefore, 
it was useless to teach them academic subjects they were not allowed to use in their life; 
b) the terms “Bantu” and “community” were keywords in developing the concept of 
ethno-nationalism, with the aim of morally and culturally justifying apartheid. At the 
same time, the reference to pastures evoked the idea that blacks were reduced to simple 
docile animals, naturally fit to tribal life in rural reserves.12 
     In the meantime, in October 1952 a CIA intelligence estimate reminded the White 
House that from the Union of South Africa came pivotal raw materials in quite a big 
quantity. In addition, the Union’s production of gold was of paramount importance for 
the financial stability of the United Kingdom and the whole Sterling Area. at the same 
time, South African port facilities were acquiring more and more importance in light of 
the fact that the Middle East and the Suez Canal area were in turmoil. In case of denial to 
the West of the usage of the Canal, the report stated that the British controlled base at 
Simonstown would be extremely useful for ship and aircraft maintenance, air and sea 
operations, convoy organisation and protection, storage and re-supply activities, and 
troop staging. The outlook the CIA was worried about was that continuation of racial 
policies in the Union would confirm the belief of the non-white intelligentsia in the 
British colonies of Africa that similar measures would be taken once the Colonial Office 
                                                 
11 In nationalist eyes, mission schools had given a sort of dangerous academic training through an English 
and liberal outlook. This was seen as en embryo of an African elite claiming equality. Instead, Bantu 
Education provided a more technical syllabus with courses delivered in Afrikaans as well as in English, 
apart from African vernacular languages at the lower levels of the school path. See W. BEINART, Twentieth-
Century South Africa, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press, , 20012, p. 160.    
12 See DUBOW, Apartheid, pp. 55-56. 
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relinquished control. On the other hand, in that moment it seemed the Nationalist 
Government did not have any intention to quit the Commonwealth, though putting 
pressure on London in order to extend the Union’s jurisdiction to the protectorates of 
Basutoland, Swaziland, and Bechuanaland.13 Another crucial point of the whole question 
was only marginally mentioned in this record, but it became the focus of a still partially 
classified report issued four years later. In a few words, while in Autumn 1952 South 
Africa had just powered up the output of uranium, only a few years later the Union had 
turned into one of the world’s largest producers, with a contract between the South 
African Atomic Energy Board and appropriate agencies of the United Kingdom and the 
United States for the purchase of uranium oxide over an extended period.14                      
     The role of the homelands was expanded in 1959 through the Bantu Self-Government 
Act, aimed at establishing a sort of separate development within the homelands, which 
were to become self-governing communities. However, the true intention of this policy 
was to make Africans nationals of the homelands rather than of South Africa. The 
homelands were encouraged to opt for independence, as this would greatly reduce the 
number of black citizens of South Africa, even if they lived in “white South Africa”. 
Under the homeland system, the government attempted to divide South Africa into a 
number of separate states, each with the purpose to be turned into a separate nation-state 
for a different ethnic group. The government justified this policy, stating there was no 
will of discrimination on grounds of race or colour. Rather, it was a policy of 
differentiation on the ground of nationhood, of different nations, granting to each self-
determination within the borders of their homelands. In this way, the blacks were 
destined to become foreign citizens working in South Africa as migrant labourers on 
temporary work permits. Hence, a lot of black South Africans who had never resided in 
their identified homeland were forcibly removed from the cities they had always lived in. 
Once a homeland was granted its nominal independence, its inhabitants were then issued 
passports instead of passbooks, meaning they were no longer legally considered South 
                                                 
13 See National Intelligence Estimate: Probable Developments in the Union of South Africa, 20 October 
1952, NIE-72, Secret, Security Information, in www.foia.cia.gov. 
14 See Scientific Intelligence Research Aid: Nuclear Activities of Foreign Nations, vol. IV, Asia and Africa, 
30 September 1956, CIA/SI 88-56, Secret, Noforn, in www.foia.cia.gov. 
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Africans.15 This “positive” apartheid is not to be regarded as the opposite of baskaap 
(white domination). Instead, it constituted the ideological antidote to it, as a way to 
reduce everyday frictions by normalising separation and providing Africans a sort of 
outlet for their political ambitions. Within the frame of this ideology, South Africa 
claimed the role of mother country of a sort of mock-Commonwealth.16        
 
2. Macmillan Speech’s Aftermath    
In his address to the South African Parliament, the British Prime Minister wanted to point 
out the necessity to follow the wind of change, since he saw the world was by then 
divided into three spheres, with the Western powers and the socialist bloc competing with 
each other to gain loyalty from newly independent non-white nations. The question was, 
therefore, whether the non aligned countries of Asia and Africa would swing to the East 
or to the West.17 Macmillan’s speech was not welcomed at all in the South African 
society, which since gaining the status of Dominion in 1910 had always been working on 
the assumption that its position within the Western community was untouchable, on the 
basis of racial and cultural links. As imperial powers like Britain and France relinquished 
former colonies, Afrikaner intellectuals and politicians started talking about development 
and self-determination. The press was extremely clear in its response to the “Wind of 
Change Speech”, stating for example that the whites could not hand over any part of 
territory they were in control. Other commentators claimed that the white man’s spiritual 
place in the world was disappearing and that the protection of imperial powers was 
vanishing. In brief, the Afrikaner mood was made clear by Prime Minister Verwoerd in 
person, when he said that thinking only of non-white people had become a sort of 
                                                 
15 Throughout homelands, the land was eroded, people earned little income from agriculture, and more than 
eighty per cent of the population was below the average level of poverty. As regarded health conditions, 
while white South Africans enjoyed some of the highest standards of health care and died of typical 
diseases of the industrialised world, including the worst rate of coronary heart disease in the world, the 
government did not keep any official medical record for Africans. In particular, infant mortality rate in 
South Africa for both coloured and black children aged from one to four was thirteen times higher than it 
was for white children. The main cause of infant mortality rate was inadequate nutrition. In general, the 
most serious diseases for Africans were the same as those in underdeveloped countries, namely pneumonia, 
tuberculosis, and gastroenteritis. See L. THOMPSON, A History of South Africa, New Haven, CT-London, 
Yale University Press, 20013, pp. 202-203.           
16 See DUBOW, Apartheid, pp. 105-106. 
17 See R.M. IRWIN, A Wind of Change? White Redoubt and the Postcolonial Movement, 1960-1963, in 
«Diplomatic History», XXXIII, 5, November 2009, p. 902. 
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psychosis no longer recognising the role of the white man. According to him, the Western 
countries were «[..] sacrificing their only real and stable friend […] for something that 
will not succeed».18  
     Despite racial disturbances the executive was by then provoking, in 1960 the 
Americans were persuaded that the white minority would be able to maintain dominance 
for a few more years. The Africans, in fact, were at the time too weak and unorganised to 
mount a successful campaign of resistance. Despite this, it was likely for the Afro-Asian 
bloc at the United Nations to adopt economic sanctions against South Africa, able to 
reduce the country’s ability to attract foreign investments and thus causing economic 
dislocation.19 As an evidence of this, the emerging States of Black Africa were expected 
to provide direct encouragement and support to Africans of the Union, who had just 
experienced brutal repression in Sharpeville, South of Johannesburg, when a crowd of 
5,000 had gathered in front of the police station offering themselves for arrest as a protest 
campaign against the pass laws requiring Africans to show a pass when crossing white 
areas. After a long stand off, the police had opened fire and about seventy demonstrators 
had remained on the ground. This was not certainly the first time that the police had 
killed Africans protesting against the system of discrimination, but the Sharpeville 
massacre became famous worldwide because it was regarded as part of the struggle 
bringing black Africans in power elsewhere in the continent.20 In light of this, according 
to American reports serious economic consequences were likely to occur due to actions 
taken outside the country. Measures like these, in fact, were already taking place, for the 
Conference of Independent African States had requested to adopt an extensive 
programme of economic sanctions and boycott against South Africa. A decision like that 
did seriously harm the Union’s economy, since the amount of national product involved 
was very small, but rather the psychological impact was able to affect the international 
community, with a negative outlook for the capacity to attract foreign investments.21      
                                                 
18 See ibid., p. 903. 
19 See National Intelligence Estimate: The Outlook for the Union of South Africa, 19 July 1960, Secret, in 
www.foia.cia.gov. 
20 See J. BARBER, South Africa in the Twentieth Century, Oxford-Malden, MA, Blackwell Publishers, 1999, 
p. 165. 
21 See National Intelligence Estimate: The Outlook for the Union of South Africa, cit. 
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     Meanwhile, the process of decolonisation gained pace. In April 1960 Eric Louw, 
Foreign Minister of South Africa, predicted that white rule would soon be confined to the 
colonial territories of Southern Africa, apart from South Africa herself. The Nationalist 
government accused the colonial powers of abandoning the white man and his 
civilization, thus allowing communist penetration into the continent. Verwoerd added that 
British colonial rule was now running away from Africa, adopting “non-racialism” as a 
euphemism for promoting black interests at the expense of whites. Moreover, in that year 
the newly independent States were located in the middle belt of the continent, and they 
had no links with Pretoria. Geographical distance allowed those countries to exercise 
foreign policy with a strong moral fervour without fearing commercial losses. At this 
point, withdrawal from the Commonwealth had become inevitable. On May 31, 1961, the 
white population of South Africa chose to turn the Union into a Parliamentary Republic, 
with the Governor General assuming the office of State President. In this way, Pretoria 
had managed to avoid expulsion and Verwoerd was still thinking of retaining 
membership, provided certain conditions were accepted, that is: a) no interference in 
domestic matters; b) no relinquishment of principles; c) no loss of sovereignty or national 
dignity.22 It is not difficult to figure out that the Premier was feeling encouraged by the 
deep-rooted trading relations with Britain, also confirmed in a secret Cabinet 
Memorandum by Her Majesty’s Lord Chancellor, stating that London’s interests in South 
Africa included investments, exports and earnings from invisibles and oil sales for more 
than one billion pounds a year. In order to safeguard these interests and keep the Republic 
within the Sterling area, the Chancellor suggested to maintain trading relations with the 
Southern African country as much as possible unchanged.23 Macmillan was available to 
reach a compromise in order to keep the new-born Republic in the Commonwealth, but a 
public debate developed at the Conference which exacerbated the conflict.24 Leaders like 
                                                 
22 See J. BARBER-J. BARRATT, South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security, 1945-
1988, Cambridge-Melbourne-New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 76.    
23 See Cabinet Memorandum by the Lord Chancellor: Future Relations with South Africa, 2 August 1961, 
C (61) 126, Secret, in http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/. 
24 Commonwealth rules stated that any country wishing to become a republic was obliged to re-apply for 
membership. In most cases, this was purely a formality, but it was not like this as regarded South Africa, 
since Nyerere was supported by Nehru of India and many other fellow African nationalists. By virtue of 
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Julius Nyerere, future President of Tanzania, warned that their countries would not join 
the Commonwealth if the racist State were allowed to remain. On the other hand, 
Verwoerd was not ready to abandon white dominance to buy the favour of other 
members.25                                                             
     The Sharpeville massacre had put South Africa on the United Nations Security 
Council agenda. This was not something taken for granted, as the United Kingdom in 
those years led any other country in terms of importance of investments in the area, with 
South Africa accounting for an overwhelming proportion in colonial Southern Africa.26 
Supported by the United States, with only Britain and France abstaining, the Security 
Council declared that apartheid policies were leading to international tensions and might 
also endanger peace and security. The American initiative had marked a change of 
attitude and that is why Britain soon followed by voting in favour of a General Assembly 
Resolution, which on November 6, 1962, requested all members to take every action, as it 
was open to them, to bring about the abandonment of apartheid policies.27 On August 7, 
1963, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 181, calling for a voluntary arms 
embargo against South Africa. In the same year a Special Committee Against Apartheid 
was established to encourage and oversee plans of action against the regime. Economic 
sanctions were also frequently debated as an effective way of putting pressure on the 
apartheid government. In 1962, the UN General Assembly requested that its members 
sever political, fiscal and transportation ties with South Africa. Due to ongoing pressure 
from African and Asian members, the Kennedy Administration was sensitive somehow to 
the question of apartheid, though the policy towards the South African ally could not be 
considered as hostile. This statement is confirmed in a secret document signed by the 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, G. Memmen Williams, who was rather worried 
about the coincidence between African pressure for action against South African policies 
                                                                                                                                               
this, Pretoria decided not to re-apply for its Commonwealth membership after becoming a republic. See J. 
FARLEY, Southern Africa, London–New York, Routledge, 2008, pp. 115-116.      
25 See BARBER–BARRATT, South Africa’s Foreign Policy, pp. 81-83. 
26 See L. TAAPOPI–T.A. KEENLEYSIDE, The West and Southern Africa: Economic Involvement and Support 
for Liberation 1960-1974, in «Canadian Journal of African Studies», XIII, 3, 1980, p. 356.  
27 See BARBER–BARRATT, South Africa’s Foreign Policy, cit., pp. 86-87. 
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and domestic powerful forces demanding historic decisions on racial inequalities. The 
Assistant Secretary’s words were clear, when he added that  
 
«[…] the time has come to review our arms policy towards South Africa. 
I believe we should be thinking in terms of a total arms embargo. […] it 
is the only way we can convince both world and domestic opinion that 
we mean business in our disapproval of apartheid».28  
 
Williams clarified his stand a month later, when he expressed concern about the intention 
of African States to judge all countries on the ground of their positive acts of opposition 
to apartheid.29 As a matter of fact, while America could do nothing but having the 
strongest objection to apartheid, this was not a good reason to single out South Africa for 
harder treatment than other countries which deliberately put authoritarian policies into 
force. The question for Secretary Rusk was whether  
 
«[…] we ourselves precipitate sharp crises in our relations with such 
States over such issues or whether we try to maintain the structure of 
international relations in order to work […] toward the decent world 
community which is our main objective».  
 
Washington could only be held responsible for what worked under the American 
constitutional system, while no one had elected the Administration to undertake such 
responsibility in other countries. 30  Apart from the Secretary, the Pentagon and the 
Secretary of Defence, Robert S. McNamara, were concerned about anything able to 
jeopardise American military interests in Africa. Any action undertaken by the U.S. on 
this issue, he said, would be likely «[…] alienate in some degree either Portugal and 
South Africa on one hand, or the African bloc on the other». Therefore, it was pivotal for 
the Americans to avoid any initiative prejudicing the relations with either side in such a 
dispute. This ambivalent position was translated into a strong verbal condemnation of 
apartheid policies, aimed however at avoiding a vote at the United nations in favour of 
                                                 
28 Memorandum from G. Memmen Williams to the Secretary through Mr. Harriman: U.S. Policy towards 
South Africa, June 12, 1963, Secret, in K. MOKOENA, ed., South Africa and the United States: The 
Declassified History, The National Security Archive, New York, The New Press, 1993, Doc. 1, pp. 54-55.    
29 See Memorandum from Undersecretary G. Memmen Williams to Secretary of State Dean Rusk: Arms 
Policy and South Africa, July 12, 1963, Secret, ibid., Doc. 3, pp. 59-61. 
30 See Secretary of State’s Memorandum for Averell Harriman et al.: June15, 1963, Secret, ibid., Doc. 2, 
pp. 56-58.  
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economic sanctions, or arms embargo, or expulsion towards South Africa and Portugal.31 
In short, the Kennedy Administration took a middle way stand, committing itself to 
support Resolution 181 on the voluntary arms embargo and deciding not to sell Pretoria 
any kind of weapon which could be used to enforce apartheid. Nevertheless, the President 
considered requests for arms required for external defence. Hence, the White House 
approved the decision to sell South Africa submarines and spare parts of C-130 aircraft.32  
 
3. After Kennedy: the Johnson Administration’s early attitude                  
At this point, with the new Administration in power after Kennedy’s assassination, the 
Embassy of South Africa was trying to put pressure in order to defend the system of 
apartheid. The Ambassador himself warned that the whole character of his country would 
be ruined if separate development were lost. What Dr. Naudé wanted to highlight was 
that it was impossible to make a comparison between apartheid and segregation in 
American Southern States. According to him, in fact, black Americans were no longer 
“negroes”, but neither were they Americans yet. Hence, they felt insecure. Instead, South 
African Bantus had not lost their African identity; therefore what the Nationalist aimed at 
was only a way to maintain their racial integrity. Despite American government officials 
proclaiming the Administration’s opposition to racial discrimination, hence it was 
impossible for Washington to acquiesce to apartheid, we can always find out that the 
main question for the White House was to prevent the black continent from shifting to the 
East.33 At the same time, there was uncertainty about apartheid in Britain as well. A 
certain number of people, according to the press, were admitting that they did not know 
much about South Africa. The point was that consumer boycott had proved ineffective 
after the indifference of the market of several products. As regarded economic sanctions, 
both Conservatives and Labour were concerned that apartheid should not be brought to a 
sudden end at the cost of following chaos. Even the left wing press affirmed that if the 
                                                 
31 See Letter from Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, July 11, 1963,  
ibid., Doc. 4, pp. 62-63. 
32 See National Security Assistant McGeorge Bundy’s Memorandum for Secretary Rusk and Secretary 
McNamara, September 23, 1963, Secret, ibid., Doc. 6, p. 70. 
33 See Memorandum of Conversation: South Africa’s Racial Policies, January 9, 1964, in National Archives 
and Records Administration (thereafter NARA), College Park, MD, Record Group 59 (thereafter RG 59), 
Central Files, SOC 14-1, S AFR, Confidential. 
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West were asked to sacrifice economic and strategic interests in Southern Africa, this 
could only be done with some clear proof that apartheid could be abolished and replaced 
by a decent form of government.34 Another reason why the whole Southern area of the 
African continent was pivotal for the Americans was due to the importance of space 
ground stations, four of which located in South Africa and one in Madagascar, supporting 
at critical phases the NASA space programme. In addition, another tracking base was 
required within a few years. All these facilities were essential requisite for long-range 
missile testing, earth orbiting unmanned satellites, lunar and planetary probes, and earth 
orbiting and lunar manned flights of the Apollo programme. Concerning all this, the State 
Department stated there was no satisfactory alternative to those ground bases, and failure 
to meet that requirement would jeopardise American key space missions and undermine 
U.S. image of scientific and technological achievement worldwide. Only the Republic of 
South Africa offered logistical support, communication and technical cooperation 
available at the same time. Any other relocation to other regions of Southern Africa could 
be met at substantial costs.35  
     Sensitivity on arms sales exploded again in 1964 when the South African government 
announced the recommendation of the Odendaal Commission first to extend apartheid 
measures to the Protectorate of South West Africa36, including separation of people to set 
up ten more homelands, and then to bring about a shift in governing powers till a real 
annexation of the territory37. This was something the United States could not allow, 
                                                 
34 See HYAM–HENSHAW, The Lion and the Springbok, cit., p. 322. 
35 See Memorandum from the Director of the Office of International Scientific Affairs (Rollefson) to the 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams): Space Tracking Activities in the Area of 
Southern Africa, March 9, 1964, in NARA, RG 59, Central Files, SP 15 S AFR-US, Secret.  
36 In 1915, South Africa had captured the German colony of South West Africa, in 1968 to be called 
Namibia. After the war, it was declared a League of Nations Mandate Territory, with the Union of South 
Africa as responsible for the administration. The Mandate was supposed to become a United Nations Trust 
Territory following World War Two, but South Africa refused to allow the territory's transition to 
independence, claiming it as a fifth province. This gave rise to several trials at the International Court of 
Justice, which in 1950 ruled that South Africa was not obliged to convert South West Africa into a UN trust 
territory, but was still bound to assume the supervisory role, clarifying that the General Assembly was 
empowered to receive petitions from the inhabitants of South West Africa and to call for reports from the 
mandatory nation. 
37 At the end of 1962, the Nationalist Government had set up a Commission of Inquiry on South West 
Africa which took the name from its Chairman, Frans Hendrik Odendaal, with the purpose to submit a 
report on a five-year plan on the development of non-white inhabitants of the territory. The document, 
issued in December 1963, suggested both the intensification of the apartheid programme in Namibia and 
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bearing also the risk to trigger off racial and anti-Western tensions in the whole Southern 
Africa. At the same time, the British Prime Minister, Alec Douglas-Home, lectured the 
South African Ambassador on the negative political and economic outcome of the 
Bantustans, while the High Commissioner in the Protectorates surrounding South Africa 
regarded the policy of “bantustanisation” as a mere perpetuation of a conquest. Despite 
this, at the time of the referendum, it was still widely believed in Britain that some form 
of white rule should continue in South Africa, as well as in British Central Africa. Much 
worse for London was South Africa’s fierce racial ideology, her antipathy towards British 
institutions in the country, and more in general her provocation of unrest and disorder 
threatening to spread into British Africa.38 In light of all this, the Johnson Administration 
issued a secret order, National Security Action Memorandum 295, directing all 
government agencies involved in South Africa to take some appropriate measures, such 
as postponing decisions on submarine sales and loan applications, and the possibility to 
relocate NASA and Defence Department facilities to other countries.39 Concerning this, an 
intelligence estimate memorandum encouraged the Administration to go on putting 
pressure on the issue of South West Africa, seeing it as a political area where a little 
flexibility was possible for Pretoria. As regarded economic sanctions, the CIA thought it 
was unlikely for nations having trading ties with the African country to impose effective 
measures. Just to make an example, the flow of South African gold was an important 
element in the financial stability of the West. On the other hand, it was also true that 
South Africa did not absolutely want to alienate commercial partners such as the UK or 
the US. Especially on the issue of Namibia, the South Africans tended to delay or temper 
                                                                                                                                               
the integration of the Namibian government with that of South Africa. Apartheid was to remain the main 
principle of political, social, and economic organisation in South West Africa as well. Theoretically, in the 
long term the task was to establish a network of independent homelands for the indigenous population, 
while white areas were supposed to become integral part of the Republic of South Africa. See M. 
WALLACE, A History of Namibia, from the Beginning to 1990, London, Hurst & Company, 2011, pp. 261-
262.        
38 See HYAM–HENSHAW, The Lion and the Springbok, cit., pp. 319-320. 
39 See National Security Action Memorandum No. 295: U.S. Policy toward South Africa, April 24, 1964, 
Secret, in D.S. PATTERSON (gen. ed.) - N.D. HOWLAND (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States 
(thereafter FRUS), 1964-1968, vol. XXIV, Africa, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C., 1999, Doc. 586, pp. 984-986.    
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their actions in order to avoid a showdown.40 This estimate is also worth remembering 
because it contains the most explicit suggestion of serious contradictions in South 
Africa’s economy leading in the long term to the collapse of white rule:  
 
«There is an internal conflict between the Republic’s racial policies, 
which close many categories of employment to nonwhites, and the 
mounting need for skilled labor».41  
 
To tell the truth, NSAM 295 had provoked another debate within the Administration, since 
not everyone was in favour of a harsher course of action against South Africa. The 
military, in fact, believed that the provisions required in the memorandum might lead the 
United States to an inflexible position, which at that time was seen as counterproductive. 
From the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s point of view, as long as communist penetration and 
racial discord in Africa were viewed as an active threat to Western interests, stability in 
South Africa was the main aim to pursue. As concern this, it is important to underline that 
the U.S. Embassy in South Africa did not suggest to follow any major action in support 
of radical proposals. Washington’s diplomats on the spot did not see any risk of internal 
security crisis. Rather, they wrote that any threat to peace came from outside South 
Africa, whose stability and economy were necessary preconditions for real progress on 
race matters as well.42  
 
4. Labour in power: arms sales and embargoes                                                           
When the Labour Party came back to power in October 1964, the debate on arms sales to 
the Republic of South Africa became particularly heated, as the new Prime Minister, 
Harold Wilson, soon promised to ban this kind of trade. Not the whole press in Britain 
was in favour. Conservative newspapers like the Daily Express, for example, were 
severely critical towards the threatened cancellation of Buccaneer aircraft, complaining 
that Labour Government was acting in an irresponsible way, with the aim of ingratiating 
                                                 
40 See Special National Intelligence Estimate: Short-Term Prospects for South Africa, 20 May 1964, SNIE 
73-64, Secret, Controlled Dissem, in www.foia.cia.gov. 
41 Ibid. 
42 See Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara: National Security 
Action Memorandum No. 295 on United States Policy toward South Africa, May 22, 1964, Secret, in FRUS 
1964-1968, vol. XXIV, Doc. 589, pp. 989-991. 
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themselves with African States such as Tanzania and Kenya, where communist forces 
and anti-European movements were so powerful that the Britons were about to be 
chucked out.43 In some way, the Tory press had been able to read among the lines of 
Government statements, as the order for the sixteen Buccaneer airplanes went through, 
thus setting a significant exception in the relations between Labour and apartheid South 
Africa. Hence, left wing public opinion took this decision as an evidence that Wilson was 
ready to sell out democratic principles for the sake of national interests and profit. After 
all, South Africa was always Britain’s fourth largest export market, the Buccaneers had 
been ordered before the issue of the UN Resolution, and they had been already partly paid 
for. Moreover, Number 10 was concerned about the likely South African reaction 
towards the neighbouring British Protectorates. Finally, it was always possible for 
Pretoria to unilaterally terminate the agreement on the Royal Navy’s use of the 
Simonstown Base. In a few words, the Wilson Government realised that economic 
warfare would damage British trading policies and investments. 44  The Labour 
Administration was following a line of continuity with the former Conservative 
government, which had stated that South Africa had the right to self defence under 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and that she had an important part to play 
in the protection of sea routes around the Cape of Good Hope.45 For this reason, being 
also Pretoria no threat to international peace, London felt allowed to sell weapons 
suitable for that purpose.46              
     After all, it is rather difficult to expect that the new government would have been able 
and willing to disappoint the country with which only a year earlier a memorandum of 
                                                 
43 See HYAM–P. HENSHAW, The Lion and the Springbok, cit., pp. 322-323. 
44 See J.W. YOUNG, The Labour Governments 1964-1970, vol. 2: International Policy, Manchester-New 
York, Manchester University Press, 2003, p. 167.  
45 From a Cold War point of view, the Anglo-Saxon powers’ concern was not so out of place, as in all 
countries were an ongoing struggle for independence against a foreign colonial power had persisted in 
those years, the Soviet Union had successfully infiltrated the leading movements and retained a post-
colonial position of influence. See A.A. BRAYTON, Soviet Involvement in Africa, in «The Journal of 
Modern African Studies», XVII, 2, June 1979, p. 265.      
46 See The British Attitude to the Problem of South Africa: FO Brief for Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ 
Meeting (“Speaking Notes”), 29 June 1964, CAB 148/2, ff 223-226, in R. HYAM – WM R. LOUIS, eds., 
British Documents on the End of Empire, Series A, vol. 4, The Conservative Government and the End of 
Empire, Part II, Economics, International Relations, and the Commonwealth, The Stationary Office, 
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agreement on the sale of uranium oxide had been stipulated, amending the previous one 
dating back to 1961.47 Another reason why economic sanctions would have not been 
profitable at all was gold. The problem was that in the previous five years, central bank 
monetary reserves of Western countries had increased by two and a half billion dollars, 
two thirds of which coming from South African gold! Losing such a big wealth, in a 
word, meant jeopardising the stability of the major currencies. No matter how vigorously 
the government might condemn racial segregation policies. The point was that the West 
could not afford to pay such an enormous price for leading South Africa to repentance.48 
Apart from that, by reading the available documentation we can easily realise the 
commercial rivalry with France, which was regarded as willing to trade with any nation 
ready to deal with her. Therefore, the possible decision to supply no further arms to South 
Africa was likely to be interpreted by the French as an opportunity to expand their own 
trade.49   
     As regarded the U.S. Administration, by virtue of the available documentation it 
seems the most worrying issue concerned the question of the status of mandatory South-
West Africa. According to the State Department, in fact, this was likely to bring the first 
major confrontation between South Africa and the international community, with 
consequent implications for the UN and the International Court of Justice, as the 
Americans were worried about communist forces acting unilaterally to jeopardise 
Western long-term interests in the continent. As a matter of fact, Afro-Asian countries 
within the United Nations were insistent that effective international action be taken 
against the South African Republic, both on the question of apartheid and on the 
Namibian issue. On one hand, Washington pursued good diplomatic and trading relations 
with both South Africa and the various sectors of the other African countries; on the other 
hand, however, it was impossible not to realise that the world was moving fast in a 
direction opposite to the one chosen by Pretoria. Therefore, a soft pressure programme 
                                                 
47 See Memorandum of Agreement between the Atomic Energy Board of the Republic of South Africa and 
the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, November-December 1963, in The National Archives 
(thereafter TNA), Kew, London, AB 48/65, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, 1964-1971.   
48 See Maurice Vlaud: Problem of Economic Sanctions against South Africa, December 10, 1964, in TNA, 
FO 371/182103, JSA, 1196/19, Confidential.  
49 See Letter to P.R.A. Mansfield from British Embassy Paris, January 13, 1965, in TNA, FO 371/182103, 
JSA 1196/19, (11919/3/65) Confidential.    
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was to be implemented towards this issue. In the long run – but this looked more as a 
declaration of intent than as an objective plan –, the aim was the promotion of an eventual 
dialogue among leaders of all groups about race relations and government by consent.50 
This position was backed by the British Labour government, which had ordered a report 
on the effect of possible economic sanctions that ruled out the possibility for Britain to 
implement any kind of trade embargo, or contribute to the costs of a blockade, thus 
destroying a market worth 220 million pounds of export each year, with financial 
investments of over one billion pounds. In addition, the Cabinet thought that sanctions 
would only produce chaos in South Africa. In a word, this was not a problem to be sorted 
out by coercion.51 To sum up, the case against sanctions rested on five main points: a) the 
impossibility to apply even partial sanctions in the light of the effects on the British 
balance of payments;52 b) the cost of a blockade, necessary to implement sanctions, 
which was too far beyond the resources of the United Nations; c) the risk for sanctions to 
have too serious repercussions on the British protectorates of Southern Africa; d) the fact 
that sanctions were likely to produce chaos in the Republic of South Africa, thus 
preventing a peaceful transition to majority rule; e) the risk to set an embarrassing 
precedent in case of Southern Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence.53  
     This posture was the outcome of the Anglo-American talks on Africa held in the 
British capital a few days previously. On grounds of the archive documentation, we can 
easily affirm that the two Atlantic powers shared the same assessment of the situation in 
Africa. The two allies agreed that the Soviet penetration of the African continent 
continued to be a serious threat. As concerned Southern Africa in particular, it was agreed 
that an attractive package of proposals had to be prospected to countries bordering with 
the area, in order to persuade them to approach the problem in a more moderate and 
rational mood, with the aim of catching the chance to develop favourable circumstances 
                                                 
50 See National Policy Paper – South Africa; Part One: US Policy, January 18, 1965, in NARA, RG 59, S/P 
Files: Lot 72 D 139, South Africa, Secret.  
51 See Brief for Anglo-American Talks on Africa. South Africa (Note by the Foreign Office), 23 February 
1965, in TNA, CAB 148/65, O.P.D. (O) (SA) (65) 2, Confidential.    
52 In the period between 1960 and 1965, South African economy literally flourished. As an evidence of this, 
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«Journal of Southern African Studies», I, 1, October 1974, p. 56. 
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for themselves, too.54 Actually, it was China that was really enlarging her own contacts in 
Africa. 55  Since Chou En-Lai’s African tour in 1963-1964, in fact, the Chinese had 
favoured the establishment of the International United Front, including also European 
countries not associated with United States policy. In particular, Chou offered the 
Africans a five-eight formula, that is five principles for Sino-African political relations 
and eight principles for economic relations. In summary, the whole package included: a) 
China as leader of the struggle against old and new imperialism; b) Chinese aid on the 
most favourable terms, in order to establish self-sufficient and diversified economies; c) 
support to African desire to observe non-aligned policies; d) greater unity of Africa and 
the Asian world, with the setting up of regional organisations as approved by the African 
people. Within this context, Chou En-Lai was careful enough to show an image of China 
as a revolutionary country dedicated to the overthrow of capitalism, but at the same time 
willing to co-operate with non-aligned States and aid less-developed former colonies of 
Africa.56 As long as the British wanted to operate in the Indian Ocean area, they of course 
had a strong interest in the use of air, naval and communications facilities, also seeing the 
Americans involved. 57  Last but not least, existing oil investments by British oil 
companies in South Africa discouraged any kind of oil sanctions, since Shell and BP 
holdings in that country represented a major British investment at risk, with foreign 
exchange earnings of twenty million pounds per annum attributable to South Africa, and 
a possible loss of twelve million pounds a year to the UK balance of payments.58 In 
addition to that, the leaders of the High Commission Territories, whose economy was 
                                                 
54 See Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee – Sub-Committee on Africa: Anglo-U.S. 
Talks on Africa, 22-24 March 1965. Note by the Foreign Office, 2 April 1965, in TNA, CAB 148/46, 
Meetings and Memoranda 1-15, O.P.D. (O)(A)(65) 14, Confidential. 
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largely dependent on South African business,59 had already declared that they could not 
risk to put their countries politically and economically in jeopardy for the sake of 
ideological differences with Pretoria. 60  Finally, on November 11, 1965, Southern 
Rhodesia unilaterally proclaimed independence from Britain, thus creating another wave 
of instability and potential subversion in the area. Concerning this, U.S. intelligence 
analysis did not show any optimism. For a certain span of time at least, economic and 
political sanctions would not be useful, the CIA stated, to put an end to white ruling and 
any military intervention was regarded as extremely unlikely. However, for black African 
States the whole question had become a sort of test of great powers’ African policies.61 
     All this encouraged the British government to keep in mind the option of leaving 
military facilities in South Africa, but the point was that losing Cape communications 
bases would have inevitably implied at least a twelve hours’ delay for signals to reach 
Her Majesty’s ships in the Atlantic Ocean. The provision of alternative facilities on 
British territory, such as Falkland Islands, or Ascension, would have taken up to five 
years to be ready and the cost would have been no less than six million pounds. 
Concerning this, the Cabinet believed that the South African government was linking the 
possibility to demand renegotiation of the Simonstown Agreement to the continuation of 
some form of defence relationship with Britain. Hence, the continued use of South 
African facilities was mostly desirable. 62  As regarded nuclear co-operation, South 
Africa’s purchase of a nuclear reactor from the United States did not elicit any concern 
that research at the reactor could involve anything but the production of energy for civil 
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and Memoranda 1-15, O.P.D. (O)(A)(65) 12, Secret. 
61 See Special National Intelligence Estimate: Repercussions of a Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
by Southern Rhodesia, 13 October 1965, in www.foia.cia.gov. 
62  See Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee – South Africa and South Atlantic: 
Memorandum by Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence Officials, 8 June 1966, in TNA, CAB 163/55, 
Africa – Southern Africa: Political-Economic Threats to S. Africa, O.P.D. (O) (66) 19, Secret. 
Bruno Pierri 
70 
purposes. In 1965, in fact, when a member of the South African Atomic Energy Board 
stated that Pretoria should have a nuclear arsenal for prestigious reasons and to prevent 
aggression from Afro-Asian countries, no comment came from the American 
Administration.63 State Department officer themselves admitted that any cessation of U.S. 
investment in that country would seriously damage the possibility to carry on a dialogue 
with Pretoria. Therefore, despite of the fact that American investments in South Africa 
totalled around a fifth of those of Britain, Washington was not ready to back economic 
sanctions.64 However, Cold War questions could not but influence Washington’s choices, 
as America sought to deny the control of the continent to the communist world,65 though 
it was also true that domestic civil rights matters were increasingly involving the United 
States in race relation problems elsewhere. In light of this, Pretoria’s choices on internal 
issues and even more on the question of Namibia, far from reinforcing South Africa as a 
bastion against communism in the world, carried the risk to foster its growth and increase 
the danger of its gaining power. Hence, the White House was always aware of the 
importance of cultivating the black African vote at the United Nations.66    
 
5. Balthazar Johannes Vorster: the architect of apartheid                              
On September 6, 1966, Verwoerd was assassinated as he was taking his seat in 
Parliament. Shortly before the murder, he had called new general elections, whose 
dominant issue was still security. Although black nationalism at home was not absolutely 
living a positive period, disturbing events were taking place elsewhere in Africa, not least 
in Rhodesia, whose declaration of independence had ended up bringing economic 
sanctions to South Africa’s doorstep. Therefore, the Government’s message had been that 
safety depended on a determined defence of the white minority. To implement this 
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decision, the Nationalist Party chose as a new Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes (John) 
Vorster, the former Minister of Justice who had fiercely fought against African 
nationalism. Concerning this, he said that the security of the State came on top of his 
agenda, as he also believed that «The communists have been organising for years to take 
over South Africa».67      
     In the meantime, on October 27, 1966, the General Assembly passed resolution 2145, 
which declared the Mandate on Namibia terminated and that the Republic of South Africa 
had no further right to administer South West Africa. Perhaps, the worst kind of injustice 
perpetrated on Namibians was the deliberate provision of lower education. In fact, Bantu 
education and an emphasis on Afrikaans as an official language to the exclusion of 
English was limiting the capacity of Namibians to communicate with the outside world.68 
Nevertheless, that was a period of international expansion for South Africa’s major 
companies and ties with the West were so strong that exiled black opposition leaders 
spoke about a spider’s web systematically spun to ensnare weak African governments, 
while Pretoria spread white rule over Africans through the Bantustans. From this point of 
view, South African policies followed three lines of conduct: a) a powerful white republic 
surrounded by compliant black satellites, such as the Bantustans, South West Africa and 
the former British protectorates of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland; b) a Southern 
African bloc, including also Portuguese colonies, Rhodesia and Malawi; c) the rest of the 
continent, with which the Boer Republic had patchy relationships. Concerning this, the 
Nationalist government realised that all levels were linked to one another, and that 
success with one of them would provoke a sort of positive domino effect. Despite this, 
the Namibian resistance movement of SWAPO (South West Africa People’s Organisation) 
had begun infiltrating guerrilla fighters into the Namibian occupied territory and clashes 
were taking places with government forces,69 which cost very much to Pretoria in terms 
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of loss of life, economic and military resources and growing international hostility.70 
Within this scenario, what the South Africans reproached the Americans for, was the 
encouragement to black Africans to disrupt the “peace and harmony” of what they 
claimed to be the only stable country of the continent. At the same time, the government 
had stated they would carry on administering South West Africa – though there was no 
attempt of annexation – and that they would reply with force to any challenge of being 
divested from that part of Africa.71         
     The independence of the former High Commission Territories looked like a positive 
change from the British point of view, as these newly formed States immediately started 
to pursue a working relationship with the South Africans in the economic and diplomatic 
field. Commonwealth leaders, such as President Nyerere of Tanzania, did not agree with 
a policy like this, but others, like for example the Kenyans, said that there seemed to be 
no possibility of overthrowing apartheid by violence, and that was why the only hope to 
change was through a gradual peaceful process of establishing good relations with South 
Africa. 72  The first sign of what looked like a turning point in the relations among 
Southern African countries, or at least an evidence of pragmatism, was the meeting 
between John Vorster and the new Prime Minister of Lesotho, Chief Leabua Jonathan, on 
January 10, 1967. Since the former Territory of Basutoland was only a small black 
enclave in the South African nation, with no link to the sea and with its skies controlled 
by Pretoria Air Force, it was impossible for it not to have good relations with the much 
more powerful neighbour. However, the event became a source of optimism for the 
British Embassy, which reminded that for a Nationalist Premier to hold such a multi-
racial luncheon with the leader of an independent black State was a great step forward. 
Apart from the list of requests advanced by Chief Jonathan in terms of collaboration and 
assistance South Africa was supposed to provide, the nationalist press saw the meeting as 
forming a new pattern of inter-state relations in Southern Africa. Therefore, what British 
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diplomats perceived was a new line in Mr. Vorster’s policy, that is the aim of establishing 
happier and more fruitful relations with other independent States in the continent, while 
still pursuing separate development at home. The fact that Chief Jonathan had declared 
that difference in political philosophy were no barrier to positive relations among States, 
seemed to encourage that point of view.73 
     In view of what afore mentioned, it was not by chance that the British Joint 
Intelligence Committee issued a report stating a long term outlook for the Southern 
Africa region, with the particular aim of figuring out whether white minorities would 
retain control of the area in the following ten years, or if African nationalism would 
increase and violence spread. According to the British intelligence, there was little doubt 
that black African States would seek to maintain support against apartheid regimes, but it 
was also true that their policies would unlikely be uniform. By reading the paper, we can 
easily realise how concerned the British were about the question of Rhodesia, on dealing 
with which African Commonwealth countries were going to put pressure on Britain, with 
the outlook to leave the organisation should London be impotent towards the illegal 
regime of Salisbury. As concerned communist powers, London’s experts stated that they 
had till then shown little interest towards that part of the planet, but at the same time it 
seemed likely that they would back African liberation movements as an easy way to 
embarrass the West at a little cost for themselves. However, even so it appeared 
extremely difficult for African liberation movements to successfully challenge the 
existing order, since the Soviet Union or China were not believed to have any decisive 
influence in Southern Africa. The dominant factor determining inner developments was 
supposed to be the determination of white minorities to keep their privileges.74 Economic 
and industrial development required the industry to find an increasing number of skilled 
black workers to meet new requirements. Despite this, the government kept a lot of 
formal and informal barriers – such as colour bars reserving specific jobs for white 
employees, resistance to the registration of black apprentices, insistence by unions to 
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observe the “rate for the job” in order to discourage employment of cheaper black 
workers, and serious deficiencies in the education and training available to the black – to 
prevent African and other non white workers to enter skilled occupations.75 To this the 
British Embassy added that there was a good chance in the following decade for the 
South Africans to economically woo black States like Kenya. Certainly, the Afrikaners 
were no longer on the defensive and this new approach was interpreted as a way to avoid 
to be overcome by the overwhelming non-white majority. The reason why South Africa 
was showing a more realistic attitude was also due to a negative outlook of food 
producing in relation to population growing. In the last years, in fact, the country had 
been obliged to import a certain quantity of food products. Therefore, British diplomats 
thought the government had no alternative but seeking good relations with neighbouring 
black countries.76 At the same time, there were a few European countries starting a really 
profitable arms trading with South Africa, despite the embargo. Just to give an example, 
since 1963 Italy and France had been playing the lion’s part in a massive effort of arms 
and ammunition transfer to South Africa. In the span of time between 1960 and 1975, 
France was going to sell something like four billion Francs of military equipment to 
South Africa, which in 1968 had become the third customer of French aviation industry.77 
In particular, South African interest in French armaments and warfare techniques had 
been developed since the Algerian war of independence. The political context following 
de Gaulle’s rise to power had certainly favoured the cooperation between the two 
colonialist countries. It was obvious for Pretoria to make an effort to learn anti-guerrilla 
techniques, after backing the French position in the North African country. As a sign of 
gratitude, General de Gaulle never pronounced in public the word “apartheid”.78 To tell 
the truth, optimism in British political circles was influenced by the Ambassador’s view 
on the need of the Afrikaners not to feel surrounded by enemies willing to destroy their 
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civilization. According to Sir John Nicholls, in fact, there were more and more people in 
South Africa ready to talk more on the complexity of racial problems and expressing 
concern at the human consequences of apartheid policies. Hence, though maintaining a 
firm stand against the racist system, the British Government were not suggested to put 
pressure for instant majority rule.79 Apart from this, we must always remember that 
Britain was the most important source of foreign capital for South Africa and that South 
African largest banks, such as Barclays National, had British parent companies. As a 
matter of fact, British banks were being accused of redirecting black savings into the 
white economy.80 Interestingly enough, CIA estimates noted that the African population 
in the white areas had been growing by fifteen per cent over the last three years and it 
appeared extremely unlikely for Bantustans to absorb significant amounts of black 
labourers in the next five years. In no major city were the white a majority and Pretoria 
was the only town where Europeans formed the largest racial group. This was going to 
have political implications, since the American intelligence believed that if the level of 
non white participation in the economy increased, at the same time there would be 
demand for increased political rights, as well as the will of the whites to preserve their 
power at all costs. Paradoxically, apartheid was favouring the job market among non-
white communities, as job restrictions was banning numerous positions to white people. 
Therefore, Prime Minister Vorster had set up a sort of new deal policy to show other 
African States that his government was ready to pursue a working relationship with 
whomever was able to trade on a non racial basis.81       
     In this period, the apparent encouraging situation in South Africa was leading to a 
debate within the British government on a possible lift of the arms embargo. This option 
was also due to the serious risk of losing shares of trade with Pretoria, which was 
reasonably expected to turn from Britain as a supplier not only in the maritime field, but 
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also in other areas associated with defence. In case of refusal to resume normal arms 
transfers, British authorities were also concerned about a reduced willingness by the 
South Africans to make a contribution towards reaching a settlement over Rhodesia.82 
According to the Foreign Secretary, George Brown, despite the embarrassing 
consequences following that decision, on balance the better course was to agree to supply 
most of the equipment requested by the South Africans. In addition the Defence 
Secretary, Denis Healey, affirmed that the naval facilities Britain enjoyed under the 
Simonstown Agreements would be essential at any time. On the other hand, it was also 
true that supplying military equipment would be probably seen as a withdrawal from 
compliance with United Nations resolutions and British relations with African 
Commonwealth countries would become even more difficult. In short, the best solution 
according to the Secretary of Defence was a bargain with South Africa, during which 
Whitehall could somewhat relax the criteria for the supply of defence equipment, in 
exchange for specific South African assistance to bring about an acceptable settlement of 
the Rhodesian question.83 To sum up, the Defence and Foreign Secretaries were facing 
Prime Minister Wilson on grounds of economic, military, political and even moral 
reasons.84 Particularly in those circumstances, they said, exports of that order, paid in 
cash or in short-term credit, were extremely important to Britain.85 The Prime Minister, 
instead, felt miserable and unhappy about his ministers pressing so much in favour of 
arms sales resumption, but he eventually conceded that in principle the sale of naval 
weapons to South Africa could be resumed, but there should be no final decision except 
as part of the deflationary package following devaluation. However, some Labour 
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backbenchers wished to condemn any sale of arms to South Africa. At that point, tension 
within the party was very high and it is also likely for Wilson himself to encourage the 
growth of protest by the extreme left, while Brown and Healey, backed by the majority of 
the party, insisted that the Premier had condoned, if not actively supported negotiations 
with the South Africans. Hence, when the Cabinet reconsidered the issue in December, 
Wilson managed to take the moral ground and said that the credit of the government was 
at stake. The whole question had left a mark of bitterness in the relationship within the 
Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary and the former had overcome the will of two of 
his most important ministers.86 The two top ministers, in fact, underlined that South 
Africa had become the second most important trading partner of Britain and that Pretoria 
was by then able to discriminate against British firms if political reasons were strong 
enough. Moreover, for budget reasons the British had been obliged to withdraw some 
ships from South African stations, thus asking Pretoria to assume greater responsibility 
for the defence of Cape sea routes.87              
     As concerned the American Administration, President Johnson was facing a real 
dilemma in South Africa. As a matter of fact, he had committed himself to ending racial 
discrimination in the United States. Yet, the US still had substantial economic and 
strategic ties with Pretoria, which enjoyed one of the fastest growing economies in the 
world. In fact, the CIA warned that South Africa was a major supplier of minerals for the 
West, especially gold and uranium. Nevertheless, that country was a source of political 
problem for the democratic Presidency, having virtually banned any kind of opposition 
and arrested what the National Security Council itself regarded as black moderate leaders, 
such as Nelson Mandela. As a consequence of this, black South Africans were turning 
towards radicalism and “black consciousness”, a movement which paralleled that of 
“black power” in the United States.88 Almost as a confirmation of these contradictions, 
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we can read that, although American tactics were clearly to refuse any renewal of the 
Atomic Energy Co-operation Agreement with South Africa, in practice the latter had 
supplied uranium to the US, but also the United Kingdom and France, without any 
restriction whatsoever. Despite this, in 1967 the State Department was prepared to 
recommend the renewal of the agreement for another ten years. 89  All this affected 
American policies on arms transfers and it is important to highlight that there was hardly 
any liaison on this issue among NATO allies and even between two Atlantic powers such 
as Britain and the United States. Having said this, we can notice that debates on the 
resumption of at least partial arms trading with South Africa were taking place not only 
within British political circles. The State Department, in fact, underlined that disparate 
standards among allies, especially between the Anglo-Saxon countries, were causing 
increasing difficulties to American manufacturers. As an example, due to the 
impossibility to sell British planes with American engines, the South African government 
was turning to the Italian Piaggio firm for similar aircrafts. The net outcome was that the 
American balance of payments was suffering, frictions with European governments were 
spreading and de Gaulle was having another chance to say that the United States was 
unreliable as a business partner.90 Perhaps this vision was encouraged by CIA reports 
claiming that liberation movements in Southern Africa would be probably suffering lack 
of indigenous support, without any chance to expand insurgency operations sufficiently 
enough to shake white regimes. It was also true, according to American intelligence, that 
the continued frustration of the liberation movements was going to further complicate 
relations with the US, but there were also other factors affecting American relations with 
African States, such as the need of many of them to look at the United States as a source 
of economic aid and development capital, as well as an essential trading partner. As 
concerned communist support to African nationalists, the Soviet Union and communist 
China, though seeking to expand their influence by providing limited military and 
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financial assistance, were not thought to be willing to engage in direct military 
intervention. The key to the whole matter, however, was always the will and ability of the 
white regimes to pay the military and economic costs to resist insurgency effects.91     
     In effect, John Vorster’s first reaction to the British decision to maintain the arms ban 
in full was coherent with what Wilson’s main collaborators had predicted:  
 
«Mr. Wilson however will be mistaken should he perhaps believe that 
cooperation can be carried out one-sidedly, and that contractual 
relations […] can be conveniently forgotten or exchanged for political 
expediency without reaction from the other part concerned. […] I have 
come to the conclusion and accept that the British Government does not 
care whether we fall prey to aggression from the sea or land».92  
 
By reading the documentation available, we are capable of figuring out that this threat 
was seriously taken in consideration by the Foreign Office, which suggested that it would 
not be wise to take the lead in getting international discussion on extending the arms 
embargo.93 As concerned the possibility of communist infiltration, the Americans were 
not the only ones to study the structure of South African society, within which the 
communists had gone further than any other political organisation in supporting the 
aspirations of non-whites and working closely with them. On that particular point, it had 
never been established whether Nelson Mandela was in fact a communist, but according 
to the British there was some evidence that he really was. Outside South Africa, the 
picture was different. The South African Communist Party had its headquarters-in-exile 
in London, and its members seemed to be involved primarily in contacting individuals in 
the Anti-Apartheid Movement. What was concerning for British authorities was the 
communist will to completely destroy white rule in South Africa and replace it 
theoretically with a non-racial democracy, which in practice would be a black State. This 
new regime was supposed to back communist world powers and throw its weight against 
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imperialists, exploiters and colonialists, among whom Britain was included.94 The sense 
of strength of South Africa was certainly based on her strategic position and natural 
resources. As concerned gold, the Minister of Finance stated that Pretoria had to 
determine her policies for the future on the basis of that raw material. The country, he 
carried on, was in a very favourable position, economically strong and with a positive 
balance of payments, as well as a minimal foreign debt. All this made it possible for 
South Africa not to be obliged to sell any gold at the moment. In the meantime, the 
mineral was being bought by the Reserve Bank, so that future sales, once necessary to 
purchase foreign currencies, would be done by the mining industry under the supervision 
of the authorities.95 Other factors favouring the Southern African country were the supply 
of exceptional cheap labour and a well-organised industry with large capital resources 
available for prospecting and investment in the most modern mining techniques and 
equipment. According to CIA estimates, the whole South African production accounted 
for about ten per cent of the GDP, was worth more than one billion dollars in 1967 and 
earned around forty per cent of the national foreign exchange. Moreover, gold exports 
represented something like forty per cent of all exports and financed close to half total 
imports. As concerned the Reserve Bank, this used the Bank of England as an agent on 
the London market, showing how Western powers were connected to South Africa, thus 
leaving really little room for manoeuvre on the apartheid issue.96 According to American 
analysis, in fact, by reducing taxes on the gold industry the government could be able to 
maintain a high level of production for still many years to come, or also use tax revenues 
to develop other industrial sectors fit for exports.97      
     In the meantime, the South Africans did not react so well to the British intention to 
withdraw their military bases from East of Suez, fearing that the vacuum left would be 
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filled by communist elements. Statements like these could have been delivered for 
domestic purposes as well, but the sense of isolation had certainly increased South 
African determination to build up national navy and improve relations with other African 
States. Having realised that Europe’s role in Southern Africa was no longer comparable 
with that of the past, the nationalist government was going to take into greater account 
countries within the black continent and in the East. On the vacuum left in the Persian 
Gulf, the Minister had also said that attempt had been made by Russians and Chinese to 
infiltrate into Southern Africa. However, the Embassy was also persuaded that such 
pessimistic statements were deliberately exaggerated first to rally nationalist opinion, and 
then to try to induce a more favourable atmosphere for the sale of arms to South Africa in 
the event of a change of government in the United Kingdom.98 Apart from military 
reasons, a good way to figure out what South Africa meant for the economy of all 
Western powers is the reading of International Monetary Fund records. In fact, South 
Africa’s aim in that period lay in the increase of gold price. Despite British opposition to 
this objective, it was high desirable that there should be no confrontation with Pretoria on 
this particular issue at the I.M.F. Executive Board, since that might in certain 
circumstances weaken the authority of that institution and push up the price of gold. It 
was a matter of fact that eighty per cent of the new mined gold, excluding Russia, came 
from South Africa.99 As an outcome of all this, by 1968 a lot of businessmen in the 
United States were clearly hostile to the Administration’s hostility to Pretoria’s policies. 
As a matter of fact, they predicted an economic boom in South Africa, especially in the 
area around Johannesburg and therefore argued that official opposition to apartheid 
negatively affected chances for American firms to capitalise new opportunities. Outside 
the establishment, instead, major demonstrations against university investments in 
companies and banks active in South Africa were taking place. The point was that the 
Johnson Administration, though defending the rights of black Americans,100 had never 
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used all possible power against apartheid South Africa. On the contrary, it was thought 
there would be the risk for South African retaliation to harm American economic and 
strategic interests. To be honest, for a lot of officials Pretoria’s violation of human rights 
was no worse than those of a good numbers of other regimes around the planet.101         
 
6. Vorster’s Outward Foreign Policy                                                                                                        
At the end of the Johnson’s mandate, the State Department had left to the successor a 
detailed analysis on the policy to follow towards Southern Africa. The real dilemma was 
always the same, that is how to conciliate indigenous claims with the safeguarding of 
American geo-political interests. Washington’s aims in the area could be summed up as 
follows: a) encouraging substantial and long-term changes; b) reducing violence and 
confrontation; c) minimising the negative outcome of violence on national interests. In 
order to best pursue these objectives, it was advisable not to put white regimes under 
pressure too much.102 However, the debate within the Administration could not ignore 
risks of communist influence in the area. Racial tensions, according to this analysis, gave 
communist countries excellent opportunities at a very low price, through funds to 
nationalist movements and assistance to black States.103 What influenced the Americans’ 
assessment most was the belief that the liberation movements of the area were not 
regarded as capable of overcoming the resistance of the white regimes for at least a few 
more years to come. In a nutshell, shortly before the Nixon Presidency in the region there 
were tangibile interests which were difficult to match with idealist intentions. First of all 
Portugal, though led by a dictatorial regime, was a member of NATO and the Azores 
Islands hosted pivotal facilities to American military operations. Moreover, the 
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Americans had investments amounting to more than a billion dollars, not to mention 
naval bases on the Southern Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.104 Concerning this, Geoffrey 
Kemp says that having South African facilities denied in a peace-time crisis would have 
produced psychological effects, rather than military ones, for the Americans did not use 
them so much.105 Though exaggerated, the reference to communist expansion was not 
totally wrong. Since the early 1960s, in fact, the national liberation movements of the 
area had been trained by the Russians as well. Vladimir Shubin, who had been assigned 
by the Kremlin to come in touch with the various leaders of African insurrections, writes 
that Soviet assistance to the South African resistance in that moment, when the whole 
military machine of the African National Congress faced liquidation, clearly showed its 
value in that area.106 
     The new Administration was certainly welcomed by industrial lobbies, as a 
Republican Presidency was supposed to be more sensitive to their requests, especially 
those dealing with raw materials trading. Moreover, a statesman like Henry Kissinger, 
recently appointed National Security Adviser and used to reading the geographical map 
through a Cold War perspective, could not absolutely ignore that South Africa was 
crucial. In addition, South Africa’s gold output was of great concern because of its role in 
determining the price system. Finally, many of the ores needed in the nuclear industry 
were located in that part of the world. Therefore, some kind of control was necessary to 
prevent their use by others, with the consequent risk to proliferate nuclear weapons. This 
control had been translated into an atomic agreement between the United States and 
South Africa. Needless to say, the breaking of such an accord could prove extremely 
dangerous for the whole world.107 In the meantime, the South African parliament was 
discussing about enacting legislation to put South West Africa under closer 
administrative control, thus reducing it to the status of another province of the Republic. 
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The bill in that moment under consideration made also all South African laws applicable 
to Namibia.108 In view of all that, it was difficult for the White House to rely on economic 
sanctions to solve the problem. Above all, such a policy was no longer thought to match 
American national interests. According to new CIA reports, in fact, though African élites 
were not so easy to influence from abroad, any circumstance undermining relations with 
the West could be exploited by the Soviets to expand their own influence, despite not 
even the American intelligence believed that the Marxist-Leninist ideology could get 
deeply rooted in a continent crossed by waves of xenophobic nationalism.109 In a few 
words South Africa, though founded on racial discrimination, was a State with a stable 
and strong government and had become a sort of bastion against any possible communist 
infiltration in the area. According to CIA experts, moreover, there was no chance for 
national liberation movements to overthrow white regime in the following decade.110 As 
concerned racial questions, instead, United States ability to influence Pretoria’s home 
policies was rather limited, since all whites regarded their domination as a non negotiable 
question of survival.111 As a matter of fact, though the Soviet Union was not being so 
successful in Africa, Chinese diplomacy was gaining ground all over the continent. 
Maoist ideology, in fact, gave Beijing a leading role in the world revolution and the 
struggle against colonialism and white racism. In addition, the old dictator was pursuing 
something like a “dollar diplomacy” and to this end Zambia offered the best outlook in 
terms of commercial and political expansion. Apart from that, China was always ready to 
finance insurrection movements as well.112  
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     In light of all these economic and strategic reasons, the relationship between the 
United States and South Africa was getting closer and closer and the apartheid question 
was inevitably being relegated to the field of moral principles which did not alter 
Realpolitik. At the same time, Afrikaner leaders were perfectly aware that neither the 
Portuguese colonial network in Angola and Mozambique, nor the settler regime in 
Rhodesia were stable and armed enough to stop the wave of black nationalism. Hence, 
relations with Washington had become more important than those with the United 
Kingdom.113 Thus, when in May 1969 fourteen African States in Lusaka, Zambia, issued 
a Manifesto to condemn the white regimes based on racial discrimination – though with 
quite a conciliatory tone, as the liberation of Southern Africa did not mean racialism in 
reverse and all people living in the continent were to be judged as “Africans” regardless 
of skin colour –, Kissinger was extremely realist:  
 
«[…] African leaders  will not abandon their basic opposition to white 
minority rule, yet they can’t reach their objective […] without outside – 
and especially U.S. – support. The long-run problem […] is how to 
reconcile their passion with that dependence».114  
 
The African context and the relations among black States had been translated into the 
meeting in April 1969 of East and central African States in Lusaka, during which a 
manifesto on Southern Africa had been issued, emphasising equal rights and human 
dignity. Therefore, there was no longer place for racism, though the whites were welcome 
in multi-racial States. At the same time, rather than calling for a commitment to 
immediate change, the document simply called for change and peaceful progress, though 
in case of armed struggle all black States were supposed to aid freedom fighters. On 
South Africa the tone was sharper, and its recommendations went much further, including 
the suggestion to expel that country from all international political and economic bodies. 
However, this distinction also contained an acknowledgement of South Africa's status as 
an independent, sovereign UN member, while Namibia, Mozambique, Rhodesia and 
Angola were colonies without recognition as states. The manifesto acknowledged the 
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right of all the whites who had settled to stay there, without any changes of boundaries 
and advocating boycott and isolation, rather than armed intervention or internal revolt. 
Above all, it urged negotiation and accepted that change could not come overnight. The 
White South African regime rejected the document and the ANC was likewise opposed as 
in their view the declaration legitimised apartheid. According to the document, there was 
one thing which distinguished South Africa from other oppressive regimes. The apartheid 
policy implied a position of privilege based on something which was beyond the power 
of anybody to change, that is the colour of skin, parentage, and ancestors. Therefore, 
abilities and behaviour were all irrelevant to a man's status. The whole system of 
government and society in South Africa was based on the denial of human equality, 
keeping the majority of the population under oppression. In consequence of all this, and 
due to the fact that no action was following declarations of intent within the international 
community, it was proposed to expel South Africa from the United Nations.115 At first the 
South African government welcomed the Manifesto, but its attitude changed as that of 
black States hardened. In fact, shortly after the issuing of the document, the Foreign 
Ministers of the group decided that peaceful progress was not possible, as the white 
regimes had closed any door of cooperation116. In the same period the African National 
Congress held a conference at Morogoro, in Tanzania. The report coming out from the 
conference set a future based more on armed struggle than on diplomacy, thus fostering 
relations with communists and the Afro-Asian bloc. Another product of the conference 
was the so-called “Revolutionary Programme”, discussing in particular the relationship 
between Africans and other peoples and recognising the former as indigenous owners of 
the country, entitled to determine its direction and destiny. However, no-one denied the 
right of the white in South Africa to legitimately live there. In future a democratic State 
had to be formed through the revolutionary forces led by the ANC itself. As regarded the 
Afrikaner national group and the whites in general, it was stated that a democratic 
government would ensure that all national groups have equal rights in a united South 
Africa. From an economic point of view, instead, the revolution was to be extended to 
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economic emancipation, so that the wealth of the land be returned to the people as a 
whole.117        
     The other question which arose at Morogoro was the nature and character of the 
movement. The outcome of this discussion was the now famous Strategy and Tactics of 
the ANC, claiming the alliance among all organisations opposing the regime, regardless of 
colour, as the only realistic alternative government. At the same time the ANC was 
learning from other organisations in the continent. In some African countries liberation 
movements, exclusively African in composition, had since independence opened their 
doors to non-Africans as members. Surely it had become undesirable to confine the 
membership of the ANC exclusively to members of the “majority group”, since this 
effectively denied the members of the `minority groups` an opportunity to participate in 
the democratic process within the ANC. This was all the more important because 
“participation in the democratic process” meant how to mobilise the different national 
groups.118 
     From the Afrikaner point of view, instead, black nationalism was publicised as an 
instrument coming from the communist powers in a global campaign in which South 
Africa was the main target. Following British colonial withdrawal from the area and the 
consequent Rhodesian independence, Pretoria had recognised that her interests were best 
served by taking part in the white regional bloc, within which South Africa emerged as 
the most developed State with an outlook of great responsibility. For this reason the 
government promoted what was called an “outward policy”, aimed at diversifying trade 
and diplomatic links and reducing political isolation. The main effort was pursued in 
Africa itself, where the Executive highlighted two objectives, provided there was no 
interference in domestic affairs, or attempts to set up common political positions: a) 
promoting peace based on mutual respect and co-operation; b) sharing economic and 
technical activities. To be more detailed, outward policy was built at three levels, that is: 
1) Greater South Africa, giving the idea of a powerful white republic surrounded by 
compliant black States, like the Bantustans, Namibia and the former British High 
Commission territories; 2) the Southern Africa bloc, including also Mozambique, Angola, 
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Rhodesia and Malawi; 3) the rest of Africa, with which Pretoria had difficult relations. 
Regarding all this, the government recognised that the relations with the West, which 
were by far more important and profitable, were also determined by the relations with 
other African countries.119     
     As concerned the Namibian question, American and British manoeuvrability on the 
South-West Africa issue was seriously reduced due to the UN Security Council 
Resolution of August 12, 1969, calling for South Africa’s withdrawal from Namibia 
within early October. In terms of mandatory sanctions, as usual the Security Council did 
not impose anything precise, for effective measures were requested, without specifying 
how. The point was that the Western powers did not share the Afro-Asian bloc’s point of 
view, according to which it was time to appeal to Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter. Among permanent Security Council members, the United Kingdom was the one 
strongly opposing such measures and ready to veto, or at least diluting mandatory 
sanctions.120 What gave South Africa a pivotal role was not only the strategic position 
and her economic strength, but also the transport system, since all newly independent 
black States were landlocked and relying on the Republic for major ports and railways. 
The outcome of this was that Pretoria’s trade in the region was eighty per cent of the total 
in Africa.121 Nevertheless, the Nationalist Party was split between the “verkrampters”, 
believing that white rule depended on rigid opposition to any change and that every 
concession jeopardised the whole edifice of apartheid, and “verligtes”, claiming a better 
future based on a certain degree of flexibility to protect the core of white authority. The 
“hawks” were led by Dr. Albert Herzog, who had been dismissed the previous year from 
the government due to his opposition to Vorster’s policies. In April 1969 he had launched 
a campaign against the political merging of Afrikaners and English speakers in the new 
white nationalism. According to this vision, the Afrikaners were those embodying the 
great complex of principles witnessed by Calvinism. From this tradition, they recognised 
the diversity of creation, from which they appreciated the love of freedom for their own 
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people and stood firm against any unlawful challenge to their authority. It was because of 
this Calvinist mentality, said Herzog, that the Afrikaner was a very good soldier for white 
civilization. On the other hand, the English were advocates of liberalism and found 
difficult to take drastic action against communist and leftist movements.122   
     Meanwhile, Vorster was aware that Conservatives in Britain had made clear that they 
favoured the resumption of arms sales for external defence. Therefore, the difference with 
Labour reinforced Pretoria’s preference for the Tories. At the same time, economic 
lobbies, such as the South Africa-Britain Trade Association, reminded that if 
concentration were placed on economics, many difficulties would be removed. These 
words seemed to be confirmed by the Foreign Secretary George Brown saying that 
Britain could not contemplate any economic war with South Africa. 123  Vorster was 
persuaded that all independent States should be treated as fully self-governing and of 
equal worth.  
 
«We as whites in South Africa», he said, «have a special duty towards 
the rest of Africa […] and to the extent that we establish the right 
relations with Africa, to that extent will our problems diminish in the 
rest of the world […] We are the only white people that are of Africa. 
[…] no-one understands the soul of Africa better than we do».124  
 
Conservative opposition in Britain denounced what they regarded as a dangerous trend. 
In fact, South Africa had been Britain’s second largest trading market, after the United 
States, but in the last months she had become the third one, after the United States and 
Australia. At the same time, in the last four-five years British exports to South Africa had 
fallen from twenty-nine per cent of the market to twenty-four per cent, while West 
Germany’s exports there had increased by three per cent, Japan's by two per cent and 
Italy’s by one per cent. In addition, said the Tories in the House of Commons on July 21, 
1969, the balance of trade during 1968 had been in South Africa’s favour for about 10 
million pounds, whereas, in most previous years it had always been in Britain's favour.125 
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7. National Security Study Memorandum 39 and the end of the Labour Government 
  
In December 1969, the National Security Council finally suggested to implement a shift 
on policy towards Southern Africa. The document issued in that circumstance, National 
Security Study Memorandum 39, became a turning point of the Nixon Administration. 
What was different about this report was its extreme realism, as it stated that sorting out 
racial problems and colonial conflicts in Southern Africa did not match American 
interests. Hence, Washington’s involvement during the years had not been due to White 
House will, but rather to a kind of necessity coming out from international attentions 
towards those questions. As concerned national liberation movements, the attitude of the 
President was influenced by Kissinger’s belief that they were a little more than puppets in 
the hands of communist powers. Such an outlook was probably due to the experience 
with Vietnamese revolutionary movements, that was why the National Security Adviser 
did not want to provoke any open conflict.126 Although NSSM 39 was intended to cover 
the whole region of Southern Africa, the Administration’s attention was primarily 
focused on South Africa. By reading the document, we can figure out that Washington 
regarded Pretoria as a reliable ally, indispensable to Western interests and responsible to 
shape the destiny of the whole area. The study was based on the assumption that  
 
«the whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change 
can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain 
the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to 
chaos and increased opportunities for the communists. We can, by 
selective relaxation of our stance toward the white regimes, encourage 
some modification of their current racial and colonial policies and 
through more substantial economic assistance to the black states […] 
help to draw the two groups together and exert some influence on both 
for peaceful change».127  
 
In reaching these conclusions, and thus rationalising the tilt in favour of the white 
minority regimes, the White House was persuaded that: a) because of her growing 
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dependency of African labour, Pretoria would soon be obliged to develop more moderate 
racial policies; b) due to lack of challenge to Pretoria’s effective power, the United States 
was not obliged to take any active role. Finally, Africans and black Americans were too 
concerned about their own domestic situation to really oppose the new policy of 
communication between the United States and the apartheid regime.128 In reviewing U.S. 
attitude towards the area, Kissinger himself outlined some objectives the Administration 
was supposed to embrace, including: a) improving American stand in black Africa and on 
racial issues in general; b) minimising escalation of violence in Southern Africa and the 
risk of American involvement; c) minimising opportunities for communist powers to 
exploit racial issues for propaganda and thus gain political influence with black 
governments and liberation movements; d) encouraging moderation in colonial and racial 
regimes of the area; e) safeguarding American economic, scientific, and strategic 
interests, starting from the South African gold market.129  
     This choice, nicknamed “Tar Baby” by Nixon’s detractors,130 implied secret arms 
supplies towards South Africa and Portugal. Apart from this, the United Nations, with the 
Afro-Asian bloc forming up to one-third of the membership, was an important forum 
where racial relations and the American posture towards Southern Africa affected U.S. 
relations with the rest of the world and the relating access to African and Asian areas, 
thus putting  in jeopardy 2.5 billion dollars of investments in Africa, one-third of which in 
the white regimes. In view of all this, Washington had all the intention to protect her own 
material interests in South Africa, with a substantial favourable trade balance. Apart from 
gold, South Africa was the third largest supplier of uranium for the West and she was also 
eager to be included in Western defence arrangements, with the outlook to initiate some 
kind of collaboration with the United States in monitoring or surveillance of the Soviet 
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Navy in the Indian Ocean.131 The confirmation of the shift in the American African 
policy came with the State of the Union Address on February 18, 1970:  
 
«Though we abhor the racial policies of the white regimes, we cannot 
agree that progressive change in Southern Africa is furthered by force. 
The history of the area shows all too starkly that violence and the 
counter-violence it inevitably provokes will only make more difficult 
the task of those on both sides working for progress on the racial 
question».132  
 
Within a context like this, the Nixon Administration was not totally against the Bantustan 
programme, since it had been developed and publicised as a way to allow black majority 
rule in the homelands, while denying the “urban” blacks in white areas any kind of right, 
thus leaving most of the country under Afrikaner control. The problem with this strategy 
was that it did not really look credible, as eighty-five per cent of the entire population of 
South Africa was supposed to be crowded into only thirteen per cent of the land. 
Nevertheless, at this time the State Department was not ready to completely rule out the 
programme, as a lot of Africans had chosen to come to terms with separate development, 
for no other course seemed left to them.133  
     Nixon’s approach to the problem was realistic: «It is obvious that we have to avoid the 
colonialist label, but we must analyse where our interest lies and not worry too much 
about other people’s domestic policies». These words were the response to what the 
Assistant Secretary to African Affairs, David Newson, had previously pronounced, 
according to whom the American investment in the whole black Africa was equal to that 
in South Africa. Apart from that, the international community had to simply acknowledge 
that white South Africans had the right to stay there, such as the Anglo-Saxons in 
America. Moreover, the former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, who had always been 
an advocate of a sort of “Anglo-Saxon alliance” leading the West against the communist 
bloc, in his April 1969 paper “U.S. Policies toward Southern Africa Require Change” had 
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suggested that America should abandon the policy aligning the Administration with the 
enemies of the white regimes. Such a trend was counterproductive, as those policies were 
impossible to achieve, they were contrary to American interests and were also frustrating 
the need of stability of both black and white nations of that area.134 Nixon himself, shortly 
before accepting the nomination to the Presidency, had said he had been disappointed by 
his trip to black Africa. According to the American statesman, in fact, in most cases the 
newly independent African nations did not have a ruling class able to achieve their 
development aims within a reasonable span of time.135 In a nutshell, Nixon and his main 
collaborators were persuaded that the previous Democratic Administrations, basing their 
approach on a mixture of moral public rhetoric and limited diplomatic requests, had 
completely failed to achieve any pivotal result. On the contrary, the only outcome had 
been that South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia had abandoned non violent methods, thus 
crushing nationalist uprisings and at the same time bypassing economic sanctions and the 
arms embargo.136 As a confirmation of this shift in policy, a few days after the National 
Security Council meeting the United States and South Africa reached a mutual 
understanding on the marketing of South African gold, assuring that most of it would go 
into the free market, thus holding down the price and promoting confidence in the official 
price.137 The situation in South West Africa, instead, was a little different due to the 
international status of the territory. Therefore, whatever it was decided to do, the White 
House regarded the South African administration of Namibia as illegal, though it did not 
support the use of force to terminate such an occupation.138  On this question, it is 
interesting to notice how realistic Kissinger’s approach was. The National Security 
Adviser, in fact, wondered what advantage the United States could gain by making 
concessions to the Africans. According to him, the Administration should have no 
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illusions that limited measures would stop African pressures. However, limiting 
investment in South West Africa (which was what the State Department recommended), 
by verbally discouraging it and terminating Export-Import Bank guarantees, could imply 
only a modest sacrifice for the United States, while strengthening its position in the event 
that a veto action at the UN became necessary to stop mandatory sanctions.139 Actually, 
Nixon followed Kissinger’s advice, ordering also his officers to encourage other nations 
to take similar actions, though the President made clear that such steps were not to be 
followed towards South Africa and the Portuguese Territories.140                   
     By reading the documentation currently available, we can realise how embarrassed the 
British Labour Government was in dealing with the South Africans. The Foreign 
Secretary reminded the South African Ambassador on March 5, 1970, that in light of UN 
resolutions, if Britain decided to supply arms to Pretoria, a lot of black African States 
would thus conclude that the only help for them could come from the Soviet Union.141 
The position of the government was being tackled by a persistent Tory opposition whose 
policy was based on the assumption that it was in the interests of both Britain and the 
West in general that South Africa be able to participate in the defence of the area 
according to the lines indicated by the Simonstown Agreement. For this purpose, Pretoria 
needed arms for external defence. As a matter of fact, Conservative leaders thought that 
the British policy towards South Africa had to be looked as a part of a whole called 
Africa. Hence, while nobody could give a positive assessment to apartheid, it was also 
rational to resume arms supplies for external defence purposes.142 After all, London was 
not bargaining from a position of strength as, due to the closure of the Suez Canal in 
1967, the route around the Cape of Good Hope carried by then twenty-seven per cent of 
the British seaborne trade, with the outlook of increasing transport of ores from 
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Australia.143 Apart from this, we cannot even ignore the American lobbies’ pressure on 
the British Government. On June 18, 1970, in fact, the Conservatives had won elections 
and pressure groups overseas relied on them as a party more sensitive to market needs. 
To tell the truth, the new government, led by Edward Heath, did not show any enthusiasm 
towards UN sanctions, but at the same time they could not afford to harm British 
economic interests in black Africa. This is probably the reason why the Cabinet issued a 
report on the economic implications of a possible change in the United Kingdom arms 
policy. To continue the ban, it was stated, would involve the sacrifice of something like 
225 million pounds of arms sales to South Africa over the following three years, not to 
mention substantial export losses in the private sector. On the other hand, the relaxation 
of the ban would call forth vigorous protests from many countries, but none of them, with 
the exception of Tanzania and Zambia,144 were expected to take serious economic actions 
against the UK.145 Both Anglo-Saxon executives aimed at pursuing a more indulgent 
policy for economic and military reasons. Southern sea routes, in fact, would have 
become even more important, once the British had withdrawn from the Persian Gulf area 
in late 1971. As a consequence of that, London did not want to risk that port facilities be 
threatened by the Soviets. Hence, Prime Minister Heath was thinking of selling to 
Pretoria a limited amount of naval war equipment, such as helicopters and frigates, 
provided they were not used for domestic repression purposes or to wage war on other 
African States. From the American point of view, the President affirmed that hostility to 
apartheid was certainly useful to have public opinion approval, but world powers like the 
United States and the United Kingdom were obliged to pursue their own national 
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interests; therefore, the Americans were ready to have normal relations with South 
Africa, as well as they had with Spain and Greece.146 
 
Conclusions  
The relations between the Nixon Administration and the United Nations, especially the 
Afro-Asian bloc and the smaller States, had become cause of frustration, as the White 
House did not understand why they were always voting against the Americans, who had 
always been major supporters of their development. In particular, during his first address 
at the UN General Assembly, at the end of 1969, he had stated that the multilateral 
organisation should be assigned a special task on the environment and demographic 
control, rather than on security and peace keeping. This was cause of attrition between 
Washington and Third World countries, but the President and the National Security 
Advisor had already chosen to limit the damage and focusing efforts on the Soviet Union 
and Communist China.147 Moreover, an action aimed at liberalising the political system 
of a sovereign State like South Africa could be easily seen as ac act of foreign subversion. 
Hence, human rights issues were regarded by the Nixon Administration as something 
dealing a policy of world order, rather than as an attempt to impose objective values on 
other countries.148 On the other hand, the dilemma for the new Conservative government 
dealt with how it was possible to match South Africans and UK businessmen 
expectations regarding relaxation of the embargo with what it was really possible to 
achieve without seriously jeopardising British relations with Commonwealth partners. In 
the long term, the Cabinet thought that South African resentment could build up to such 
an extent as to harm British trade in case London did not allow important requirements 
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for Pretoria. Therefore, it seemed worthwhile to gain the highest possible trade benefit 
with South Africa, that is allowing the sale of arms for external defence.149  
     Britain’s shift was by then on the way. The Prime Minister had decided to resume 
arms supply and was making it clear in conversations with Commonwealth leaders. Heath 
was persuaded that Black African countries had to learn to live with South Africa, as no 
one was going to settle the Southern African problem by force. Moreover, African leaders 
could not pretend to ignore that their countries economically depended on the ongoing 
trade with South Africa and Rhodesia as well. 150  The question of arms supply had 
become public in Britain, and the Government did not hide the intention to give effect to 
the purposes of the Simonstown Agreement to export to South Africa certain limited 
categories of arms, as long as they were for maritime defence. This, said the Foreign 
Secretary Douglas-Home while addressing the House of Commons, did not mean that 
Whitehall agreed with the racial policies of the South African Government. Therefore, it 
was always made sure that in no circumstances there would be sales of arms for internal 
repression. In other words, the Tory government believed it necessary that South Africa 
have arms to efficiently collaborate with Britain. As concerned United Nations 
resolutions, the Foreign Secretary reminded they had never been mandatory and that the 
former Conservative Government had expressly accepted recommendations in so far as 
arms were concerned in relation to internal strife.151 A few days later, quite realistically 
Douglas-Home stated that the policy of any Government was to sell arms to any country 
unless that country was a declared enemy, which was not certainly the case of South 
Africa, and, in addition, to attach limitations to the nature of the weapons to be sold. In 
addition, the Secretary of Defence stated that, in light of the revision of Agreements 
under the previous Labour Cabinet in 1967, South Africa had by then a more important 
part in the command structure of the Southern Atlantic defence. A Soviet attack of any 
kind was not considered as a serious imminent risk, but he said it would be idle to pretend 
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that the penetration of the Soviet Navy into the Mediterranean was not causing 
considerable concern, as Russian influence had grown not only in the Mediterranean, but 
also in the Middle East and in the Red Sea.152  
     According to Defence Department reports, as long as the Suez Canal remained closed 
the area off Southern Africa formed only a limited part of the seaways linking Europe, 
East Africa, the Indian sub-continent and the Far East. The point was that even if the 
South Africans had been willing to fully co-operate with Britain on the defence of those 
sea-routes against a possible Soviet expansion, nothing would have been effectively 
possible without the American naval presence in the area.153 In virtue of all this, the 
following step the report suggested was entering into official negotiations with Pretoria, 
while at the same time trying to reassure Commonwealth countries by undertaking to 
consult with them before reaching any new arrangement with South Africa.154 In light of 
all this, the Conservative Government was seriously thinking of reverting to the British 
pre-1965 position at the United Nations, that is selling to South Africa strategic arms 
which could not be used for the enforcement of apartheid, with the particular 
recommendation to link such trade with offers – such as building of social infrastructures, 
water supplies and irrigation networks, secondary and university education – improving 
material prosperity and communications of the population of the former High 
Commission Territories, 155  including the non white inhabitants of South Africa. 156 
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Concerning this, Heath and Douglas-Home had a difficult task to pursue, as the question 
of arms sales to Pretoria was also and first of all a very emotional issue in black Africa.157 
Seeing it from a strictly British point of view, the prime UK defence interest in that area 
was to deter the Soviets from harassing or seeking to limit the free flow of trade along the 
Cape routes, with a focal area off the Cape of Good Hope. The association of British and 
South African forces, in terms of access to naval and military facilities, was obviously a 
good deterrent to overcome Russian maritime pressure.158      
     The British had practically reached the same conclusions as the Americans on how to 
safeguard national interests in Southern Africa. Political stability was pivotal to defend 
economic and military interests, and on this purpose quiet relations with Black Africa 
were also important. That is why Whitehall top representatives were committed in having 
talks with African leaders, in order to avoid the risk of important countries to quit the 
Commonwealth and implement discriminating measure against Great Britain. In addition, 
the consequence of such a policy favouring South Africa could encourage Black Africans 
to turn to the Soviets and the Chinese for arms and commodities, thus increasing 
communist influence in the area, with a possible acquisition of military facilities. On the 
other hand, the Cabinet thought that by accommodating Black Africans London would 
not gain such political gains, as similar pressures were possible in the future.159 American 
conclusions were similar, as Kissinger complained about the lack of any moderate Black 
African bloc. Hence, the President and his closest collaborator were persuaded that a 
“local Leviathan” like South Africa could play an important role on the Cold War chess-
board, thus putting off racial issues to an indefinite future. Apart from this, the United 
States needed raw materials for nuclear weapons and the South African country was 
pivotal from this point of view. Concerning this, it had become more profitable to 
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purchase such goods from white States exploiting cheap black workforce.160 Such a way 
to make business was not surprising at all, if we consider how pivotal South Africa had 
become in terms of uranium sales not only to Britain and the United States, but also to 
France. In March of the following year, in fact, the CIA estimated that Pretoria had 
220,000 tons of uranium oxide reserves, with an output of four thousand tons per year, 
representing about twenty per cent of the Western total production and placing the 
country third behind United States and Canada among leading suppliers. In addition, the 
very low comparative cost of uranium recovery, being a by-product of gold extraction, 
put South Africa in an extremely favourable position in the market.161   
     The realism characterising this new phase of Anglo-American policy towards 
Southern Africa was due to the awareness that the Afrikaner government had no intention 
whatsoever to give up apartheid, as South Africans did not stop saying that if one went 
further than self determination within Bantustans, the black majority would then be able 
to crush the white minority. Nobody in the West thought that white communities in the 
area would ever give up power, nor that anyone would be able to win a large-scale war 
against them. Moreover, the outward policy probably misled Western governments about 
a perceived intention to ameliorate the conditions of the African majority by pouring 
money into the Homelands, being also sure that none of them wanted full 
independence.162 Moreover, in those days Prime Minister Vorster said in Parliament that 
he was ready to enter into a non-aggression pact with neighbouring States, as well as any 
other country in Africa. Instead, the Foreign Minister at the United Nations stated that he 
would be happy to discuss the matter further with anyone interested in that proposal.163 
On the other hand, Downing Street was conscious of the tensions with Black Africa 
States, whose leaders they tried to convince that isolating the South African regime was 
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only a way to consolidate it. Therefore, the best hope of bringing about a more liberal 
system, stated Edward Heath, lay in maintaining contacts between Pretoria and the outer 
world, relying on the economic pressure coming from industrial expansion. Instead, a 
charismatic figure like Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania, pointed out that Black 
Africa’s relations with Pretoria were not based on defence matters, but rather on 
considerations dealing with apartheid. What for Britain was a question of Cold War 
issues and balance of payments, for Black States was a matter of principle and honour. 
The fact that the Simonstown Agreement had been signed in 1955, when most African 
States had not gained independence yet, implied that a new situation request a new 
attitude. All defence motivations and speeches about the Soviet threat in the area did not 
convince the Africans about the necessity of coexisting with the South African Leviathan. 
For the British, in short, the overriding consideration seemed to be what London regarded 
as the Soviet threat to sea communications. On the contrary, for the other African States 
priority was South African and Portuguese policy of white supremacy.164  
     Nevertheless, encouraging enough for the British was the fact that the leaders of 
former High Commission Territories said they secretly agreed with the policy over South 
Africa, feeling that the Russian presence in the Indian Ocean was a serious threat, thus 
justifying supply of arms for external defence. Such a posture is not to be interpreted as a 
betrayal of racial equality principles, but rather as a lack of choice for countries 
completely dependent on trade with the Afrikaner regime and entrapped within an area 
dominated by white minorities, though they did not think that South Africa had any 
intention to invade African neighbours.165 Instead, the most influent African countries did 
not share this point of view. Important and emerging States, like Nigeria, Tanzania, 
Zambia, focused their arguments on the alliance among racist former colonies and a 
dictatorial imperial reality such as Portugal. Such a combination of interests was 
inflaming the whole area and the British government had failed to understand the real 
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nature of the problem166. According to this analysis, it was South Africa’s policy to do 
anything possible to promote instability and weakness in the region, so that black 
countries could not have any chance to challenge Pretoria’s basic tenets of racialism.167 
To tell the truth, Vorster’s view was not so much a change in policy, since Verwoerd had 
already realised that friendly relations with as many black states as possible were 
necessary. As more African states became independent, resentment towards a racist and 
oppressive South Africa grew. If South Africa did not want to become totally isolated, 
she needed to maintain friendly relations. Vorster focused on economic aspects, knowing 
that many African countries were very poor and needed economic assistance despite their 
rejection of South Africa’s racial policy. The principle of non-interference was at the 
basis of the outward-looking policy, as well as that of separation among races. The 
Premier stressed South Africa’s successful trading performance in the past two decades, 
together with scientific and cultural exchanges, and this was something the British and 
the Americans could not afford to ignore. The apartheid country had become a reliable 
factor for the balance of payments, beside the strategic reasons widely shown in this 
paper. Tories had a realistic approach to these problems and had been likely encouraged 
also by Vorster’s statements, according to whom South Africa’s neighbours had nothing 
to fear from Pretoria, which instead recognised the independence of Black African States. 
As a gesture of good will, the Parliament had removed from the Constitution the article 
previously providing the possibility of incorporating former British protectorates in the 
area.168 
     The real issue was the firm white control on Southern Africa. Though London was 
obliged to take into account Commonwealth relations, the two Atlantic Powers were 
absolutely persuaded that the “colonial belt” in that part of the continent would be able to 
grant stability and protection from radical infiltrations, while any violent overthrow of 
existing regimes would expose the area to the communist threat. This was the Cold War 
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paradigm a lot of white citizens of Southern Africa exploited to influence Western 
Powers’ policies, by proclaiming that movements of black emancipation were inspired 
and manipulated by communist forces around the world. Despite this, for at least a whole 
decade the outlook was thought to be favourable to the South African Leviathan, whose 
racist policies were regarded as a question of survival, therefore not negotiable. In a word, 
the American ability to influence domestic racial issues in that country was very limited 
and thus useless to pursue.169 This was also due to the trivial nature of Vorster’s outward 
policy. Good neighbour relationship did no mean solving the problem at all. It was more 
a sort of escape from the problem. The Prime Minister, in fact, was impudent enough to 
affirm that African States had to understand the essential features of separate 
development, based on the mutual protection of cultural identity not in a multi-racial land, 
but rather in a land with nations, each with the right to live on its own in the territory it 
occupied,170 regardless of forced movements of most of the population to the least fertile 
ends of the country. On the other hand, separate development produced an outcome 
opposite to the one Vorster was relying on. Apartheid universities established exclusively 
for black students nurtured cultural reaction to government programmes of racial 
separation. Under the name of Black Consciousness and with the leadership of some 
young activists like Steve Biko, while rejecting accusations stating that they had accepted 
the principles of apartheid and were a product of disillusionment with liberal doctrines, 
those students argued that blacks should first develop their own identity and institutions, 
and then their own cultural strength before co-operating with whites on the basis of 
mutual respect. All this because until then the system had oppressed the black so much 
that they had become a bunch of beggars publicly smiling at the enemy and swearing at 
him in secret. Fear was what the whole system had been built on, said Biko. The 
movement was outlawed on grounds of its “revolutionary” aims. When asked in court to 
explain the concept of black consciousness, Biko said that the black in their own 
fatherland were oppressed both by the State and also by themselves, since they had been 
convinced to be inferior and to associate anything good with the white. The aim of the 
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movement, therefore, was to infuse a new pride, opposing the image of Africans as 
depending on the good will of the white minority: 
  
«The most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of 
the oppressed», he carried on rejecting Bantustans and claiming «[…] a 
total accommodation of our interests in the total country, not in some 
portion of it».171      
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